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OPINION 
    
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Eugene Davis petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentence enhancement. The District Court dismissed his petition 
for lack of jurisdiction. We will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2009, Davis pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Iowa to unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
The District Court determined that Davis’s three prior convictions for burglary under Iowa 
law qualified as “violent felonies” under the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). That increased 
the penalty for his § 922(g)(1) conviction from no more than 120 months’ imprisonment 
to at least 180 months. The District Court ultimately imposed a sentence of 210 months, a 
decision later affirmed on direct appeal.  
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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In 2012, Davis challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The District Court denied that motion and declined to grant a 
certificate of appealability. In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit denied Davis’s request to file a successive § 2255 petition.1  
Later in 2016, Davis again asked the Eighth Circuit for permission to file a 
successive § 2255 petition. This time, he directed the court to Mathis v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 2243 (2016), which held that convictions under Iowa’s burglary statute did not 
qualify as “violent felonies” under the ACCA. But the Eighth Circuit denied his request, 
concluding that Mathis “did not announce a new rule of constitutional law.” (App. at 70.) 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2); cf. United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 230 (3d Cir. 2018). 
In 2017, Davis petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania2 for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241, once again relying on Mathis to 
challenge his ACCA sentence enhancement. The District Court dismissed the petition for 
lack of jurisdiction, and Davis timely appealed.3  
 
1 That request relied on Johnson v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held 
that ACCA’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).  
2 Although § 2255 petitions are filed with the sentencing court, § 2241 petitions are 
filed in the district of confinement. Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 178 
(3d Cir. 2017). As a result, Davis’s § 2255 petition was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Iowa (the court that sentenced him), and his § 2241 
petition was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(where he was confined). 
3 “The District Court had the power to ascertain its own jurisdiction, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order denying [Davis’s] petition for lack of jurisdiction.” Gardner 
v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 “Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal 
prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences.” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 
117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). But they are not the exclusive means, because a prisoner may 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if § 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  
We considered the language of this “safety-valve” clause in In re Dorsainvil, a case 
involving a petitioner convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 119 F.3d 245, 246, 249 
(3d Cir. 1997). There, the petitioner challenged his sentence under § 2255, asserting 
ineffective assistance of counsel and double jeopardy, but that motion was denied. Id. at 
246. After the Supreme Court later narrowed the scope of § 924(c)(1), the petitioner asked 
for permission to file a successive § 2255 petition based on that decision. Id. at 246–47. 
We denied the request, but noted that “under narrow circumstances, a petitioner in [this] 
uncommon situation”—i.e., a petitioner “claim[ing] that he is being detained for conduct 
that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening Supreme Court 
decision,” with “no other avenue of judicial review available” to “challenge his 
conviction”—may use the safety-valve clause of § 2255 to challenge his conviction under 
§ 2241. Id. at 248, 251–52. 
Davis’s petition does not fall into these “narrow circumstances.” He is challenging 
neither his conviction under § 922(g)(1), nor his Iowa burglary convictions. Instead, he 
claims to be no longer eligible for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e). But that provision is only “a sentence enhancement . . . and does not create 
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a separate offense.” United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2000).4 And we have 
never applied Dorsainvil to “issues that . . . arise regarding sentencing.” Gardner v. Warden 
Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2017).5 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Section 2255(e) does not permit Davis to challenge his sentencing enhancement 
under § 2241. So we will affirm the dismissal of Davis’s petition. 
 
4 Cf. United States v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203, 211 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)—the statute at issue in Dorsainvil—“defines a separate offense”). 
5 See Gardner, 845 F.3d at 102–03 (no jurisdiction over petition alleging that a judge 
found facts that increased the mandatory minimum sentence, in violation of Alleyne v. 
United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)); Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120–21 (no jurisdiction over 
petition alleging that a judge found facts that increased the maximum sentence, in violation 
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)); see also Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 
290 F.3d 536, 538–39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (no jurisdiction over petition alleging 
that the Government never notified petitioner of its intention to pursue enhanced recidivist 
sentence, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 851). We note that Dorsainvil’s interpretation of 
§ 2255 deviates from the textual conclusions reached by other courts. See, e.g., Prost v. 
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 585 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that § 2255’s safety-valve clause 
only “ensur[es] the prisoner an opportunity or chance to test his argument,” with “no 
guarantee about outcome or relief,” so that “[t]he ultimate result may be right or wrong as 
a matter of substantive law, but the . . . clause is satisfied so long as the petitioner had an 
opportunity to bring and test his claim”). But Dorsainvil and its progeny bind our analysis. 
